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This article asks if the role of the Enlightenment philosopher was, as understood by contemporaries, 
to work against elites, or to underpin them. Concentrating particularly on the arch-elitist Frederick 
the Great and his court philosophers, we will track the notion of the elite and their position as 
holders of truth and enlighteners. The central tenet of the debate will concern the notion of lying to 
the masses and the utility of truth. It will be shown that advocacy of absolute truth was rare and 
often dissimulated by philosophers keen to avoid censure. This dividing line will be used to show the 
cultural transfer of Francophone debates to the German intellectual sphere.
The connotation of the concept of ‘elite’ is determined by the context in which it is used. In current usage, 
talk of ‘elitism’ or ‘political elites’ instantly brings forward notions of unearned privilege and inequality. 
However, an ‘elite athlete’ or an ‘elite soldier’ connotes exceptional talent and merited success. What 
lies at the crux of this dichotomy is perhaps equality of opportunity. In the Enlightenment era, talk of 
equal opportunities was rare. Elitism did not carry its modern negative connotation. Yet the notions of 
the masses and the people certainly did. The people always exist in a binary relationship with ‘leaders’. 
But what about equality? Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie defined ‘natural equality’ as:
that which is found among all men solely by the constitution of their nature. This equality is the principle 
and foundation of liberty . . . Since human nature is the same in all men, it is clear that according to 
Nick Treuherz
59
natural law everyone must value and treat other people as any other beings who are naturally equal to 
himself, that is to say, as men like himself.1
This definition represents the traditional natural law conception of all men sharing an essentially 
equal constitution and a consequent duty of care. Political elites did not widely share this idealistic 
view of the masses as peers, and, as we will see, state paternalism was a useful notion behind which 
tyrannical elites could hide. If natural equality could be acknowledged, social equality certainly could 
not. The notion of elitism is a useful dividing line then, which can be applied to gauge the extent to 
which we can consider a philosopher’s political outlook to transcend the hierarchical social orders of 
the absolutism of their age. Of course, the fraught relationship between the so-called elites and the 
masses was not a new phenomenon. Horace’s infamous odi profanum vulgus et arceo (I hate the rabble 
and keep them away) shows the conflict is perennial. Our study is therefore limited to the eighteenth 
century.
In this essay, we will consider whether certain eighteenth-century philosophers viewed the ‘project’ of 
the Enlightenment as an opportunity for all, or whether they considered that the advances of philosophy 
and science should be restricted to an elite. To do this, we will focus on the French philosophes and the 
court of Frederick II, King of Prussia.
Recent scholarship of the Enlightenment has been dominated by Jonathan Israel’s project of defining 
the ‘Radical Enlightenment’.2 However, the precise characteristics of what constitutes radicalism can 
sometimes be more transient than one might wish. One dividing line could be seen in the utility of 
lies, or the absolute necessity of truth. As one indicative source on the issue, we can usefully consult 
the Encyclopédie article ‘Lies’, written by Jaucourt, which states that there is a distinction to be made 
between lying and speaking falsehoods, between ‘lying’ and ‘uttering a falsehood’:
Lying is a dishonest and condemnable act, but we can utter a casual falsehood; we can utter one which 
is permissible, praiseworthy, and even necessary. Consequently, a falsehood that the circumstances 
render as such, must not be confounded with a lie, which reveals a weak soul or a vicious character. We 
must not therefore accuse of lying those who use ingenious fictions or fables in order to teach, to protect 
the innocence of someone, to calm an enraged person ready to hurt us, or to help a sick person accept 
1 Diderot & d’Alembert 1969, I, 1100. Art. ‘Egalité naturelle’. Original: “Celle qui est entre tous les hommes par la 
constitution de leur nature seulement. Cette égalité est le principe & le fondement de la liberté . . . Puisque la nature 
humaine se trouve la même dans tous les hommes, il est clair que selon le droit naturel, chacun doit estimer & traiter 
les autres comme autant d’êtres qui lui sont naturellement égaux, c’est-à-dire qui sont hommes aussi bien que lui.” All 
translations are my own.
2 Israel 2002; Israel 2006; Israel 2011.
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treatment, or to hide state secrets which must not be revealed to the enemy, or any similar cases 
where legitimate and entirely innocent use can be obtained for ourselves or others.3
Eighteenth-century discourse thus distinguished between lying and a fiction designed to teach, 
protect innocence or avoid conflict. There existed a defence of falsehoods when they are meant 
well and will procure legitimate and entirely innocent utility.4 The question we will consider here, 
then, is what constituted utility, and who controlled the politics of knowledge.
This essay is not an answer to the question of how the philosophes, a diverse agglomeration of 
thinkers in any case, envisioned education of the masses, a task which has been done elsewhere.5 
Neither is it a retelling of the responses to the question posed by the Berlin Académie’s essay 
competition, “Is it useful to mislead the people?”6 Instead, we will consider the issue of the 
perceptions of the political and philosophical elite attitudes towards the ‘people’, with a focus 
on Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, and his philosophical interactions with the French 
philosophes. The paternalism of government, then, and its use of lies towards the governed are the 
subject of our analysis. Given the range of relations various philosophes held with this so-called 
Enlightened Despot, it is the constellation around the monarch upon which we will focus our 
study. In the Encyclopédie, the very notion of philosophe is defined as being a part of the world, 
and not a separate entity. Du Marsais even evokes the utilitarian aspect of the philosopher: “Our 
philosopher does not feel exiled in this world or believe he is in enemy territory . . . he wants to 
enjoy himself with others . . ., he is an honest man who aims to please and make himself useful.”7
Were the philosophes democratic? Elitist? Egalitarian? Was their aim to spread the 
‘Enlightenment’s ideals’, in the broadest sense of the term? Or were they contemptuous of the 
uneducated masses? Of course, when we ask questions like these, the notion of taking different 
thinkers as a homogenous group of programmatic philosophes disintegrates. The differing 
3 Diderot & d’Alembert 1969, III, 845. Art. ‘mensonge’. Original: “Mentir est une action deshonnête & 
condamnable, mais on peut dire une fausseté indifférente; on en peut dire une qui soit permise, louable & même 
nécessaire: par conséquent une fausseté que les circonstances rendent telle, ne doit pas être confondue avec le 
mensonge, qui décele une ame foible, ou un caractere vicieux. Il ne faut donc point accuser de mensonge, ceux 
qui emploient des fictions ou des fables ingénieuses pour l’instruction, & pour mettre à couvert l’innocence de 
quelqu’un, comme aussi pour appaiser une personne furieuse, prête à nous blesser: pour faire prendre quelques 
remedes utiles à un malade; pour cacher les secrets de l’état, dont il importe de dérober la connoissance à l’ennemi, 
& autres cas semblables, dans lesquels on peut se procurer à soi-même, ou procurer aux autres une utilité légitime 
& entierement innocente.”
4 Such a falsehood would be known as a ‘mensonge officieux’.
5 Payne 1976.
6 Krauss 1966. Original: “Est-il utile de tromper le peuple?”
7 Diderot & d’Alembert 1969, II, 1368. Art. ‘philosophe’. Original: “Notre philosophe ne se croit pas en exil dans 
ce monde; il ne croit pas être en pays ennemi . . . il veut trouver du plaisir avec les autres . . . c’est un honnête 
homme qui veut plaire et se rendre utile.”
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opinions mean we cannot ask such a leading question, and must concentrate on particular cases, so as 
not to impugn an entire category of thinkers. 
A preliminary word about literacy and reading habits is also necessary. Although literacy figures 
for the past will always be estimates, it has been stated that in 1700, only 5% of the population of 
the German territories was literate (80,000–85,000). This situation did change through the course 
of the eighteenth century, however, and the same study estimates that 350,000–500,000 Germans 
could read in 1800 – though definitions of ‘literate’ vary widely. Ruppert estimates that by 1800, the 
literacy rate had risen to 30% of the population.8 There has been considerable academic focus on the 
growth of reading in Germany in the Enlightenment era. Catering initially to a very restricted number 
of literate people, the book trade grew massively throughout the century, with exponential growth from 
the 1760s onwards. Despite the initial low literacy rates, there are many other factors which point to 
an increasing engagement with philosophical works. The spread of reading and books manifested itself 
in Germany in the rapid expansion of reading societies, known as Lesegesellschaften. By the end of 
the eighteenth century, there were more than 400 such groups in Germany.9 These functioned on the 
principle that their members bought material collectively thereby giving them access to material which 
would otherwise have been restricted to wealthy private libraries. Thus when considering philosophers’ 
claims about the reading habits of the masses, we must keep this context in mind.
In the first part of this essay, we will examine the evolution of Frederick the Great’s attitude towards 
‘lying’ to the masses, and specifically how this determined his relationship with La Mettrie, the French 
exile to whom he offered asylum in Prussia. We will then consider Frederick’s particular reaction to 
d’Holbach’s Essai sur les Préjugés (1770) before offering an analysis of how this context shaped the 
Berlin Académie’s 1780 essay competition question, “Est-il utile de tromper le peuple?” Finally, this 
series of Francophone debates will be considered in terms of its impact on German debates of the role 
of Enlightenment and the autonomy of the individual in relation to elites. We will analyse two very 
different German-language philosophers – Immanuel Kant and Heinrich Friedrich Diez – to show that 
French-language reflections on the questions of elitism and concealing knowledge had echoes beyond 
linguistic borders.
Frederick’s own position on elitism and paternalism changed radically during his lifetime. In 1740, 
the then Prince anonymously penned his French Anti-Machiavel ou Examen du Prince de Machiavel, 
shortly prior to acceding to the throne that year. The work also owes a great debt to Voltaire, who 
8 Ruppert 1980, 342.
9 Müller 2002, 19.
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edited the text.10 Indeed, Frederick’s interest in Machiavelli was triggered by Voltaire’s glowing 
reference to the Italian in Siècle de Louis XIV, to which the future monarch objected. Machiavelli 
was thus the subject of correspondence between the two, with Voltaire encouraging the prince to 
write his refutation, which, because of the mounting pressures on Frederick due to his father’s 
illness, was entrusted to Voltaire in the final stages of production, for light editing and the 
printing process. Frederick’s negative opinion of Machiavelli was undoubtedly informed by Pierre 
Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et critique, which described the maxims of Machiavelli as “très 
mauvaises”.
Frederick thus repeats this condemnation of Machiavellianism and propounds honesty and 
transparency as the route to virtue. The book is introduced with clear intentions: “I dare to defend 
humanity against this monster who wants to destroy it, I dare to oppose reason and justice against 
sophistry and crime . . . I have always seen Machiavelli’s Prince as one of the most dangerous 
works.”11 Frederick maintained his belief in the importance of absolute monarchy, but on the 
condition that the monarch be benevolent and thus help the people: 
How deplorable is the people’s condition when they have everything to fear from the abuse of 
sovereign power and their needs are prey to the avarice of the prince, their freedom to his caprice, 
their peace to his ambition, their security to his perfidy, and their life to his cruelties?12
Frederick thus accepts that the fate of the masses lies at the whim of monarchs, and by 
extrapolation, an elite. However, this seems acceptable, because, in his view, the monarch is 
benevolent, and strives for virtue.
He then establishes his position that honesty must trump Machiavellian plotting:
Artifice and dissimulation, therefore, will live in vain on this prince’s lips. In his words and actions, 
ruse will be useless: men are not judged on their word – we would always be deceived – but we 
10 [Frederick II, King of Prussia] 1996 (London, 1741). The work also appears in the Complete Works of Voltaire, 
which is the edition we will cite from in the following analysis.
11 Frederick 1996, 115. Original: “J’ose prendre la défense de l’humanité contre ce monstre qui veut la détruire, 
j’ose opposer la raison et la justice au sophisme et au crime . . . J’ai toujours regardé le Prince de Machiavel comme 
un des ouvrages les plus dangereux.”
12 Frederick 1996, 116. Original: “combien n’est point déplorable la situation des peuples lorsqu’ils ont tout à 
craindre de l’abus du pouvoir souverain lorsque leurs besoins sont en proie à l’avarice du prince, leur liberté à ses 
caprices, leur repos à son ambition, leur sûreté à sa perfidie, et leur vie à ses cruautés?”
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compare all their actions, and then their actions to their words. Falsity and dissimulation cannot 
stand up to such persistent cross-examination.13
Frederick thus adopted the position whereby ruse and artifice would always be revealed as 
such by an examination of a man’s deeds. Thus lying apparently serves no purpose. However, 
Frederick is not, even at this early point of his life, a naïve believer in truth above everything. 
Indeed it has been suggested that whilst he was writing the text, his position began to evolve 
as he came to discuss foreign policy. Frederick’s invasion of Silesia and the Treaty of Breslau 
of 1742 were denounced as Machiavellian across Europe.14 The later chapters of Anti-Machiavel 
are characterised by increasing concessions to Machiavelli, as Bahner and Bergmann describe in 
their introduction.15 Indeed, if the people of Prussia were given this text as a political manifesto 
in a democracy in the 1770s, Frederick would have been hoisted by his own petard.
Frederick’s confusion comes to the fore when he begins to accept certain Machiavellian positions, 
particularly concerning warfare. Keen to expand a just war theory, he defends the opinion that: 
“There are pre-emptive wars, which Princes are wise to engage in. They are offensive to truth, but 
no less just.”16 Reasoning that more bloodshed can be averted by a pre-emptive war, ‘truth’ can be 
trodden on for utilitarian reasons. This explanation seems to be echoed in the argument for the 
mensonge officieux that Jaucourt would later outline in his Encyclopédie article on ‘Lies’.
We thus have a rather idealistic and confused notion of the acceptability of elite lying. In any 
case, what becomes clear when Frederick’s ‘virtue’ is put to the test by other philosophical ideas 
advanced by French writers is that the very position of the elite is challenged. That the proper 
functioning of a nation led by a monarch who ruled by divine right depended on the contingency 
of a kind and caring prince surely invalidated its premise. What was needed, certain philosophes 
argued, was more autonomy for and participation of the people, aided by a greater understanding 
of the issues, and more freedom of expression and thought. Self-autonomy in thought would 
naturally raise doubt about the future of those merely born into privilege, as evidenced by 
Frederick’s reactions to the way the philosophes subtly undermined the authority of divine right, 
absolute monarchy. 
13 Frederick 1996, 195–6. Original: “L’artifice donc et la dissimulation habiteront en vain sur les lèvres de ce 
prince, la ruse dans ses discours et dans ses actions lui sera inutile: on ne juge pas les hommes sur leur parole, 
ce serait le moyen de se tromper toujours; mais on compare leurs actions ensemble, et puis leurs actions et leurs 
discours: c’est contre cet examen réitéré que la fausseté et la dissimulation ne pourront rien jamais.”
14 Pollitzer 1966, 58.
15 Frederick 1996, 33.
16 Frederick 1996, 329. Original: “Il y a des guerres de précaution, que les Princes font sagement d’entreprendre. 
Elles sont offensives à la vérité, mais elles n’en sont pas moins justes.”
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Frederick’s f lirtation with radicalism was always seen as an elite activity, which makes his 
occasional autocratic edicts on censorship all the more difficult to understand. On the 11 May 1749, 
the Prussian monarch issued the Edict, wegen der wieder hergestellten Censur, derer Bücher 
und Schrifften, wie auch wegen des Debits ärgerlicher Bücher, so ausserhalb Landes verleget 
werden.17 This established a system of censorship for Prussia separate from the apparatus of the 
Frankfurt-based Imperial Book Commission, ostensibly aimed at stopping the flow of ‘scandaleuse 
Schriften’ apparently infiltrating Prussia.18
One of the principal victims of this move, and indeed perhaps the principal reason for it, was 
the French doctor and philosopher Julien Offray de la Mettrie (1709–1751). La Mettrie had fled 
France after the publication of his Histoire naturelle de l’âme (1745), which was immediately 
confiscated and burnt following an Arrêt by the Parlement of July 7, 1746.19 In turn, he was forced 
to flee Holland after the publication of his Homme machine in 1747. The fact that La Mettrie was 
forced to flee from Holland speaks volumes, given the generally high levels of toleration for which 
the country was renowned. After the intervention of Elie Luzac and Maupertuis, a compatriot 
already settled in Berlin, La Mettrie was afforded refuge in Berlin by Frederick II, who offered 
him the position of lecteur to the King. He was thus able to continue writing and publishing 
philosophical works. Their relationship, however, was strained and underlined the limits of 
Frederick’s views on Enlightenment.20
It was La Mettrie’s Discours sur le bonheur (1748) which really outraged Frederick.21 This 
text was uncompromising in its hedonism and its permissive morality. The anti-authoritarianism 
was anathema to Frederick’s commitment to the divine right of kings. To follow the precepts of 
La Mettrie’s thought would liberate the masses from the constraints of authoritative, despotic 
government and elite power structures.
This links in with our current concern with elites and eighteenth-century philosophy in that 
La Mettrie was obliged to write a new Discours Préliminaire to his collected Oeuvres.22 This 
prefatory text contains many clues as to La Mettrie’s genuine thinking on the politics of knowledge. 
17 The Edict can be viewed at <http://digitale.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/vd18/content/titleinfo/5836863>. 
References to online sources are accurate as of 24 March 2014. Writings published by universities or the Berlin 
Académie were exempt from censorship.
18 It is noteworthy that the Edict uses this terminology of ‘scandaleuse’, derived from the French, which denotes 
a link between the concept of scandalous writings and French origins.
19 Negroni 1995, 322, n. 292.
20 For more details on this strained relationship and the potential links to La Mettrie’s early death, see Pénisson 
2006.
21 See La Mettrie 1975 for the critical edition, edited by John Falvey, who suggests that this text led to Frederick’s 
censorship edict.
22 See Thomson 1981 for the critical edition of the Discours Préliminaire. 
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Here, the provocative Frenchman was writing in order to justify his lifetime’s work and to gain 
official permission for the work to be published. The context in which he composed this work, 
by extension, could be seen to be conditions of persecution in the ‘Straussian’ sense, and thus 
allow for a hermeneutical approach for reading between the lines.23 This model of interpretation 
considers the true ideas that are to be expressed behind the forms of expression that are acceptable 
to a reigning authority. If expressed without inhibitions, such ideas would have been subject to 
censure. That is to say that La Mettrie is here forced to dissimulate his true views, and justify 
the role of the philosopher in society. He had recently come to realise that Frederick would not 
tolerate views which put his authority and the position of absolute monarchy at risk. Thus La 
Mettrie adapted his discourse to align with the dominant perceptions of elites and masses. It 
is from this context that we can analyse these writings, which seek approval and the stamp of 
authority.
In relation to the people, La Mettrie wrote in his Ouvrage de Pénélope ou Machiavel en 
médecine, published under the pseudonym of Aletheius Demetrius, that “all nations are monstrous 
composites which resemble each other . . . Isn’t the people everywhere stupid and imbecilic, a 
slave to opinions and prejudices, isn’t it the world over a kind of Hydra with a hundred and one 
thousand crazy, empty and light heads?”24 There is no mistaking a certain level of contempt for 
non-elites here – they are described as stupid and enslaved by prejudice. Yet by terming them 
slaves, there are, by extrapolation, slave-masters. Is this a critique of the power of elites, or an 
embrace of a ‘natural’ situation, presaging later Nietzschean perspectives in philosophy? Even the 
metaphor of the endless heads of the hydra, as well as connoting threat, also permits us to view 
La Mettrie’s philosophy as a mission. He is perhaps the knight wishing to continue chopping off 
these heads to enlighten the people. In his most famous work, L’Homme Machine (1747), written 
prior to Frederick’s censure, he writes that the task of the philosopher is to proclaim and diffuse 
the truth they have found: “It is not enough for the wise man to study nature and truth, he must 
dare to speak the truth in favour of the small number of those who want to and are able to think; 
because for the others who are willingly slaves to prejudice, it is no more possible for them to 
attain truth than for frogs to fly.”25 This is perhaps an allusion to the philosopher-king. For whilst 
23 Cf. Strauss 1952.
24 La Mettrie 1750, 315. Original: “Toutes les nations sont des composés monstrueux qui se ressemblent . . . le 
peuple n’est-il pas partout sot, imbécile, esclave de ses opinions et de ses préjugés? n’est-il pas dans toute la terre 
une espèce d’Hydre, à cent mille et mille têtes folles, vuides et légeres?” 
25 La Mettrie 1987, 63. Original: “Il ne suffit pas à un sage d’étudier la nature et la vérité; il doit oser la dire en 
faveur du petit nombre de ceux qui veulent et peuvent penser; car pour les autres, qui sont volontairement esclaves 
des préjugés, il ne leur est pas plus possible d’atteindre la vérité, qu’aux grenouilles de voler.”
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La Mettrie’s metaphor is perhaps insulting, the verb ‘attain’ does not mean that the masses should 
not be offered the truth.
Other later remarks by La Mettrie would not perhaps allow us to maintain such an interpretation, 
if it were not for the fact that our interpretation must take account of the restraints on the author. 
It is possible to isolate quotations from their context and misread La Mettrie. The following is 
drawn from the Discours préliminaire: “The people do not live with the philosophers. People do 
not read philosophical books. If, by chance, one should fall into their hands, they will either not 
understand anything, or will not believe a word.”26 Here, La Mettrie claims that the people do not 
read books and cannot understand them. This offers philosophers immunity – for they can carry 
on writing, given that philosophy, La Mettrie claims, has no impact on society – and certainly 
holds no danger for political elites – for the masses are incapable of instruction. It disguises 
the radical potential of the philosopher to enlighten the masses. For Frederick, it is reassuringly 
contemptuous of the masses, underlined by a later passage which emphasises the stupidity of the 
people who will not even believe what they are told by philosophers: “Materialists can prove all 
they like that man is only a machine, the people will never believe any of it.”27
Taken out of context, such partial and tendentious statements as these offend our modern 
‘democratic’ sentiments. However, we must view these statements historically. There are two 
crucial aspects of the context that we need to take into consideration in order to avoid thinking 
of La Mettrie as an unreconstructed elitist. Firstly, in the age we are studying, a statement about 
the lack of readers for philosophical works would be perfectly correct, as outlined above. Thus La 
Mettrie can claim that the masses did not read, even though this was changing rapidly and books 
were increasingly entering wider society. In any case, La Mettrie is perhaps not being honest in 
his appraisal of European literacy. His statements elsewhere about the courage of philosophers 
provide insight into his view of the role of a philosopher as a beacon of knowledge which would 
allow society to reduce harm and increase pleasure. Indeed, his interest in being published was to 
be read, and to effect change.
It is antithetical to see La Mettrie as contemptuous of reading or the masses. La Mettrie’s claim 
that the people do not read is to be seen as a disingenuous plea for freedom from censorship. He 
does not seriously see philosophy as harmless to existing orders. It was, after all, the printed 
26 La Mettrie 1987, 24. Original: “Le peuple ne vit point avec les philosophes. Il ne lit point de Livres philosophiques. 
Si par hasard il en tombe un entre les mains, ou il n’y comprend rien, ou il n’en croit pas un mot.”
27 La Mettrie 1987, 20. Original: “les matérialistes ont beau prouver que l’homme n’est qu’une machine, le peuple 
n’en croira jamais rien.”
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word, in the form of the Bible, which kept the masses in order, and thus other forms of printed 
matter would surely be capable of ending this order.
The provenance of the Discours préliminaire only underlines this Straussian reading. La 
Mettrie had originally planned that his Discours sur le Bonheur would be the first text of his 
completed works, the Oeuvres philosophiques, which had been commissioned by Frederick. 
However, the monarch rejected the Discours sur le Bonheur, and so La Mettrie was forced to write 
a new work to introduce the volume. He used the occasion to write a defence of philosophy. Thus 
he claims that philosophy cannot change things, and that the esprits forts are simply an elite, who 
live completely separately from the masses, and have no intention of attempting to enlighten the 
uneducated. They are, in Voltaire’s terms, the “athées de cabinet”, or closet atheists.28 La Mettrie 
would have his reader believe that philosophy canaffect no change in society. In the Système 
d’Epicure he even states that “Philosophy is only a science of nice words.”29
Yet all this can be seen as a strategy by La Mettrie to plea for the constraints of censorship to 
be relaxed. His real intention is to spread materialism and for the elites to share knowledge with 
the masses. By claiming that elite philosophy is not for the masses, he stakes a claim for freedom 
for writers:
Thus all our writings are mere fairy tales for the masses, frivolous reasoning for those unprepared 
to receive the germination; for those who are ready, our hypotheses are equally without danger. . . .
But what, couldn’t the common man be seduced after all by some philosophical glimmers, easily 
glimpsed in the torrent of enlightenment that the philosophy of the day seemingly pours forth.30
La Mettrie’s pessimism belies a desire for enlightenment to spread further, as illustrated by 
this quotation from the Ouvrage de Pénélope ou Machiavel en médecine: “It is all too rare to be 
doubly famous, that is to say among savants and among the people.”31 
La Mettrie uses the Discours préliminaire, addressed to Frederick, to conform to the distinction 
between a philosophical sphere and a public, social sphere: 
28 Voltaire 2011, 162. 
29 La Mettrie 1987, 368 (§XLII). Original: “la Philosophie n’est de même qu’une Science de belles paroles.”
30 La Mettrie 1987, 20. Original: “Ainsi chansons pour la multitude, que tous nos écrits: raisonnements frivoles, 
pour qui n’est point préparé à en recevoir le germe; pour ceux qui le sont, nos hypothèses sont également sans 
danger . . . Mais quoi, les hommes vulgaires ne pourraient-ils être enfin séduits par quelques lueurs philosophiques, 
faciles à entrevoir dans ce torrent de lumières, que la philosophie semble aujourd’hui verser à pleines mains?”
31 La Mettrie 1750, 352. Original: “Il est trop rare d’être doublement célèbre, c’est-a-dire parmi les savants et 
parmi le peuple.”
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I do not speak in society of all those high philosophical truths, which are not made for the masses. 
If one dishonours a great remedy by giving it to a patient beyond hope, one prostitutes the august 
science of things by discussing it with those uninitiated with its mysteries, those who have eyes but 
do not see and have ears but do not hear.32
In the Discours préliminaire, La Mettrie is thus arguing, disingenuously, that philosophy is 
a discipline reserved for elite minds, and not applicable to the practice of life. To drive home 
this point, La Mettrie uses the analogy of mathematics to ask what difference any philosophical 
findings make:
I think I have proved that remorse is a prejudice born of education and that man is a machine 
governed imperiously by an absolute fatalism. Perhaps I am mistaken, I want to believe so, but 
supposing that, as I sincerely believe, it is philosophically true. Why does it matter? All of these 
questions can be classed as the mathematical point, which only exists in the heads of mathematicians, 
and other problems of geometry and algebra for which the clear and ideal solution shows the force 
of the human mind.33
That achievements in mathematics are said to be demonstrative of the strength of the human 
mind is an indication of the importance of philosophy too. That there is no application in everyday 
life for mathematics is a further clue as to La Mettrie’s sentiments. If men were to believe that man 
was a machine and believe the world to be governed by fatalism, there are obvious consequences 
for the existing organisation of society. To deny this is clearly a smokescreen. This divide between 
theory and practice, and between philosophers and the masses, is the central tenet of the Discours 
préliminaire. Indeed the distinction is expressed clearly for La Mettrie’s protector – Frederick 
– as the divide between philosophy and politics: “philosophy, desirous only of truth, tranquil 
contemplator of the beauties of nature, incapable of temerity or usurpation, has never encroached 
on the rights of politics.”34 It is crucial to note that La Mettrie here makes clear he does not want to 
32 La Mettrie 1987, 33. Original: “Je ne parle point dans la société de toutes ces hautes vérités philosophiques, 
qui ne sont point faites pour la multitude. Si c’est déshonorer un grand remède, que de le donner à un malade 
absolument sans ressource, c’est prostituer l’auguste science des choses, que de s’en entretenir avec ceux qui 
n’étant point initiés dans ses mystères, ont des yeux sans voir, et des oreilles sans entendre.”
33 La Mettrie 1987, 21. Original: “J’ai cru prouver que les remords font des préjugés de l’éducation, & que l’homme 
est une machine qu’un fatalisme absolu gouverne impérieusement: j’ai pu me tromper, je veux le croire: mais 
supposé, comme je pense sincèrement, que cela soit philosophiquement vrai, qu’importe? Toutes ces questions 
peuvent être mises dans la classe du point mathématique, qui n’existe que dans la tête des géometres, & de tant de 
problèmes de géométrie & d’algebre, dont la solution claire & idéale montre toute la force de l’esprit humain.”
34 La Mettrie 1987, 16. Original: “la philosophie, amoureuse de la seule vérité, tranquille contemplatrice des 
beautés de la nature, incapable de témérité & d’usurpation, n’a jamais empiété sur les droits de la politique.”
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usurp the monarch’s absolute power and that philosophers are “far from wishing, as is commonly 
imagined, to destroy everything.”35
Thus La Mettrie’s seemingly dismissive attitude to the possibility of educating the masses must 
be understood, given its context, to be nothing of the sort. This explicit reference to the ‘danger’ 
of philosophical writings is a disingenuous claim about the impotence of philosophy: “Let us not, 
therefore, fear that the mind of the people will never model itself on that of the philosophers, too 
far out of its reach.”36 His strategy becomes crystal clear with his invocation to the censor, namely, 
Frederick: “Let us be free on our writings.”37
La Mettrie’s death in November 1751, in Berlin, prevented the further disintegration of his 
relationship with Frederick. Five years later, Frederick’s main philosophical interlocutor, Voltaire, 
wrote on the subject of lying to the people in Jusqu’à quel point doit on tromper le peuple (1756). 
It was here that Voltaire gave his reflections on the question “to what degree the people, that is to 
say nine out of ten humans, must be treated like monkeys”.38 This short text recounts a string of 
historical superstitions which have been overcome and is in truth too cryptic to be of much use in 
determining Voltaire’s true feelings regarding the question he had set himself. 
Fortunately, it is a question Voltaire discussed elsewhere throughout his career. Chapter XX 
of Voltaire’s Traité sur la Tolérance (1763), a work with a very specific intention following the 
Calas affair, examines whether “it is useful to maintain the people in superstition”.39 Even here, 
writing within the context of a Protestant having been wrongly sentenced to death for the murder 
of his own son – a miscarriage of justice motivated by Catholic prejudice – Voltaire defends the 
need for prejudice: “man always needs a brake.”40 Moreover, he repeats his consistent anti-atheist 
argument: “A reasoned, violent and powerful atheist would be a scourge every bit as gruesome as 
a bloodthirsty superstitious man.”41 This rather meaningless comparison – given that regardless 
of convictions, the qualifiers ‘violent’, ‘powerful’ and ‘bloodthirsty’ determine these cases – shows 
35 La Mettrie 1987, 17. Original: “loin de vouloir, comme on l’imagine communément, tout bouleverser.”
36 La Mettrie 1987, 23. Original: “Ne craignons donc pas que l’Esprit du peuple se moule jamais sur celui des 
Philosophes, trop au dessus de sa portée.”
37 La Mettrie 1987, 45. Original: “Soions donc libres dans nos écrits.”
38 Voltaire 2010, 37. Original: “jusqu’à quel degré le peuple, c’est-à-dire neuf parts du genre humain sur dix, doit 
être traité comme des singes.”
39 Voltaire 2000, 242. Original: “S’il est utile d’entretenir le peuple dans la superstition.”
40 Voltaire 2000, 242. Original: “l’homme a toujours eu besoin d’un frein.”
41 Voltaire 2000, 242. Original: “Un Athée qui serait raisonneur, violent et puissant, serait un fléau aussi funeste 
qu’un superstitieux sanguinaire.”
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Voltaire’s inherent contempt for the masses and his defence of elites (in direct contradiction of 
Pierre Bayle’s paradox): “everywhere where a society is established, a religion is necessary.”42
Without bringing the religious foundation of society into question, Voltaire seeks to distinguish 
religion from superstition. Religion, for Voltaire, is natural religion whereby a supreme artisan 
creator acts as a providential arbiter of reward and punishment in the afterlife in order to regulate 
human behaviour, which is unseen by the institutions of society. This is, therefore, no defence of 
Christianity or existing revealed religion. Indeed, Voltaire argues in this chapter of the Traité sur 
la tolérance that “Every day, reason penetrates in merchants’ shops in France, as in the abodes of 
the lords.”43
Voltaire stringently attacks those religious leaders (“Masters who have been paid and honoured 
for so long to daze the human race”44) whom he considers to be exploiting their disciples and 
teaching outright superstition by labelling them “Bêtes farouches”. So Voltaire navigates a middle 
path concerning the relative positions of the elites and the masses. Nowhere does Voltaire defend a 
modern democratic anti-elitist model of society, in keeping with the majority of his contemporaries. 
Even in private correspondence, he defended the monarchy: writing to Damilaville in 1762 about 
the posthumous publication of Boulanger’s Recherches sur l’origine du despotisme oriental (1761), 
he claimed that “brothers must always respect morality and the throne”.45
As with most philosophes, there are numerous expressions of Voltaire’s view of the wider masses 
as incapable of thought: “the populace, who are not made for thinking.”46 What distinguishes 
Voltaire’s views, however, is that he considers the masses merely unprepared for the truth. In the 
1734 Lettres philosophiques (section XIII), he maintains that the philosophes “do not write for 
the people”, which explains why “one must never fear that a philosophical sentiment could harm 
the religion of a country”.47 This, as we saw when analysing La Mettrie’s Discours Préliminaire, is 
dissimulation, and not to be taken at face value. Sixteen years prior to La Mettrie’s text, Voltaire, 
having suffered at the hands of an absolute monarch, including a spell in the Bastille, knew full 
well that he had to plea for clemency from the censors, and play down the danger of philosophy in 
42 Voltaire 2000, 242. Original: “partout où il y a une Société établie, une Religion est nécessaire.”
43 Voltaire 2000, 244. “Chaque jour la raison pénètre en France dans les boutiques des Marchands, comme dans 
les hôtels des seigneurs.”
44 Voltaire 2000, 244. Original: “Maitres si longtemps payés et honorés pour abrutir l’espèce humaine.”
45 Voltaire, “Letter to Etienne Noël Damilaville: Saturday, 19 January 1762.” In Electronic Enlightenment, 
edited by Robert McNamee et al. University of Oxford. <http://www.e-enlightenment.com/item/
voltfrVF1080255a_1key001cor/> References to online sources are accurate as of 30 March 2014. Original: “Les 
frères doivent toujours respecter la morale et le trône.”
46 Voltaire 2008, 421. Art. ‘Bled ou blé’. Original: “la populace, qui n’est point faite pour penser.” 
47 Voltaire 1964, 175. Original: “n’écrivent point pour le peuple.” And “il ne faut jamais craindre qu’aucun 
sentiment philosophique puisse nuire à la Religion d’un Païs”.
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what was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent censorship of his text. So Voltaire’s statements 
about the innocence of philosophy is a strategy. Yet in contradistinction to La Mettrie, Voltaire’s 
whole philosophy relies on an afterlife of reward and punishment.
In Dieu. Réponse au Système de la nature (1770), Voltaire differentiates between the “athée 
de cabinet” (a virtuous scholarly atheist, literally a ‘closet atheist’) and the “athée de la cour” 
(literally the ‘court atheist’, depicted by Voltaire as a hedonistic, seemingly crazed madman bent 
on destruction and bloodshed). He admits that virtuous atheists exist, using the example of 
Spinoza: “Spinoza never acted wrongly.”48 He concludes, however, that these virtuous atheists 
have a pernicious effect on practical atheists, above all rulers: “The closet atheist is nearly always 
a peaceful philosopher, the fanatic is always turbulent, but the court atheist, an atheist prince, 
could be the scourge of the human race.”49
In his Dictionnaire philosophique (1764), Voltaire’s most consistent claim is that atheism 
cannot prevent crime.50 He confounds atheism with lawlessness and thus holds a fundamentally 
elitist position. Voltaire concludes “that atheism is a very pernicious monster in those who govern, 
and also in those in retreat, although their lives are innocent, because from the closet they can 
reach those in power . . . it is nearly always fatal to virtue”.51
His conviction that humans have an innate tendency to unvirtuous behaviour informs his 
desire for a system of control. Religion is a necessary control mechanism, which also necessitates 
an elite to run society and in some way to lie, by insisting on the contingent truth of religion. 
Whilst Voltaire’s worldview does not preclude autonomy, it does not encourage all members of 
society to emancipate themselves from instruction. 
In several places, another philosophe, Helvétius, expressed the belief in the necessity of truth 
and the futility of superstition. Aligning himself with Diderot and d’Holbach, he complained of 
the Enlightenment’s lack of progress, in a chapter heading in De l’Homme: “Progress of truth – 
of the slowness by which truth spreads.”52 In a footnote to section VII of the same text, he writes 
that “In morality . . . the only really harmful thing is not looking [for truth]. Whoever preaches 
48 Voltaire 2011, 162. Original: “Spinosa n’a pas commis une seule mauvaise action.”
49 Voltaire 2011, 162. Original: “L’athée de cabinet est presque toujours un philosophe tranquille, le fanatique est 
toujours turbulent mais l’athée de cour, le prince athée pourrait être le fléau du genre humain. Le malheur des 
athées de cabinet est de faire des athées de cour.”
50 Voltaire 1994a, 388. Art ‘Athée, athéisme’. “L’athéisme ne s’oppose pas aux crimes.”
51 Voltaire 1994a, 391. Art ‘Athée, athéisme’. Original: “Que l’athéisme est un monstre très pernicieux dans ceux 
qui gouvernent, qu’il l’est aussi dans les gens de cabinet, quoique leur vie soit innocente, parce que de leur cabinet 
ils peuvent percer jusqu’à ceux qui sont en place . . . il est presque toujours fatal à la vertu.”
52 “Progrès de la vérité – De la lenteur avec laquelle la vérité se propage.”
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in favour of ignorance is a rogue who wants to dupe fools.”53 In correspondence with Martin 
Lefebvre de La Roche, Helvétius writes: “You ask me if it is good to educate the people. And why 
could education do harm? If a few men have an interest to deceive, nobody has an interest to be 
deceived. The greatest number must therefore be allowed the greatest freedom to examine the 
pros and cons.”54 This freedom implicitly involves the work of philosophers targeting the greatest 
number as an audience.
Writing to Frederick the Great, Diderot’s collaborator on the Encyclopédie d’Alembert claimed 
that: “The people is an imbecilic animal who allows itself to be led into darkness.”55 One can 
infer that the addressee of this letter has perhaps altered the terminology with which d’Alembert 
expresses himself. These rather harsh terms denote a criticism of the extant situation, rather than 
a call to exploit the people even more. Also, d’Alembert’s desire for Enlightenment ideas to spread 
far and wide is attested by his desire to produce a cheap version of d’Holbach’s Bon Sens (1772), 
which he suggested in a letter to Voltaire in August 1775: “I think like you about this Bon Sens 
which seems to me a much more terrible book than the Système de la Nature. If the book was 
abridged any more (which could easily be done without loss) and it was published cheaply, it could 
be bought and read by cooks.”56 Thus Enlightenment, as represented in printed books, was in 
d’Alembert’s view, a democratic ideal for the philosopher to share with the people. It was of course 
d’Alembert who helped Frederick to formulate the Berlin Académie essay question in 1780. Before 
we consider that, however, we will turn to the reactions to d’Holbachs’s Essai sur les préjugés.
D’Holbach’s campaign against religion and superstition changed strategy after his initial phase 
of publishing amended translations of works by English deists and freethinkers and the printed 
versions of texts by French libertins, such as Fréret, whose atheistic works had previously only 
53 Helvétius 1776, 369. Original: “En Morale . . . la seule chose réellement nuisible est la non-recherche [du vrai]. 
Qui prêche l’ignorance est un fripon qui veut faire des dupes.”
54 Claude Adrien Helvétius, “Letter to Martin Lefebvre de La Roche: Tuesday, 4 August 1769.” In Electronic 
Enlightenment, <http://www.e-enlightenment.com/item/helvclUT0050104_1key001cor/>. Original: “Vous me 
demandez s’il est bon d’instruire le peuple. Et pourquoi l’instruction pourroit-elle nuire? Si quelques hommes ont 
intérêt à tromper, nul n’a intérêt à être trompé. Il faut donc laisser à tout le monde la plus grande liberté d’examiner 
le pour et le contre.”
55 d’Alembert, Jean Le Rond. “Letter to Frederick II: 30 November 1770.” In Electronic Enlightenment Original: 
“Le peuple est un animal imbécile qui se laisse conduire dans les ténèbres.”
56 d’Alembert, Jean Le Rond. “Letter to Voltaire: 15 August 1775.” In Electronic Enlightenment <http://www.e-
enlightenment.com/item/voltfrVF1260139_1key001cor/>. Original: “Je pense comme vous sur ce Bon Sens qui 
me paroît un bien plus terrible livre que le systême de la nature. Si on abrégeoit encore ce livre (ce qu’on pourroit 
aisément sans y faire tort) & qu’on le mît au point de ne coûter que dix sols, et de pouvoir être acheté et lu par les 
cuisinières.” Friedrich Melchior, Baron von Grimm also saw Le Bon Sens as a book which the non-elites would be 
capable of reading, but unlike d’Alembert, was fearful of its potential: “C’est l’athéisme mis à la portée des femmes 
de chambre et des perruquiers.” 
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existed in manuscript form.57 D’Holbach instead turned to write his own original texts (though 
heavily influenced by his previous reading) and, through his contacts in Holland, published a 
series of programmatic, prescriptive texts. The Essai sur les préjugés caused a great stir in France, 
although it was not banned, according to Negroni.58 Unfortunately, the ‘French Book Trade in 
Enlightenment Europe’ database contains no sales statistics for the Essai sur les préjugés from 
the Société Typographique de Neuchâtel.59 We cannot, therefore, judge the diffusion of the book 
in Prussia or elsewhere. However, by examining the reaction of Frederick the Great, we can 
ascertain that it had a substantial impact.
Reading the text, it becomes obvious why Frederick was moved to publish a refutation. 
D’Holbach’s text, published under the pseudonym of Mr. D.M., alluding to Du Marsais, clearly 
continues the discourse on the utility of the truth for the masses, announced in the first pages: 
“truth is necessary to man, and error can only ever be dangerous to him.”60 Later on in the text, 
the sovereign would find himself as a direct interlocutor: “truth is equally necessary, to both 
the sovereign in order to shore up his power, and to the subjects to be happy, submissive, and 
peaceful. . . . A good king, far from fearing truth, will always take it himself as a guide, and will 
want it to enlighten his people.”61 Frederick’s sensitivities were triggered by sentences like the 
following: “a despot who commands irritated subjects does not become a victim of truth, but of 
imprudence and impetuous ignorance.”62 He did not take well to the prescriptive elements of the 
text, such as: “equitable princes will recognize that they do not have the right to deprive them 
[their subjects] of truth.”63
That the book caused a stir across Europe is illustrated by the book-length refutation by 
Frederick, Examen de l’Essai sur les préjugés, published in 1770. Mark Curran has commented 
that Frederick’s Examen, “at seventy octavo printed pages, was relatively lengthy but ill-conceived. 
It was an unruly piece, occasionally intelligent but poorly structured, which amounted to little 
57 See Hammersley 2010, 123–132.
58 Negroni 1995. Dawson 2006 also contains no mention of this work.
59 For the French Book Trade in Enlightenment Europe, see <http://fbtee.uws.edu.au/stn/interface/>. This 
project has made available the database of the archives of the Société Typographique de Neuchâtel, a key source 
for work on the eighteenth-century French book trade, as originally made famous by Robert Darnton. 
60 D’Holbach 1770, 2. Original: “la vérité est nécessaire à l’homme, & l’erreur ne peut jamais lui être que 
dangereuse.”
61 D’Holbach 1770, 142. Original: “la vérité est également nécessaire, et au souverain pour assurer son pouvoir, et 
aux sujets pour être heureux, soumis et tranquilles. . . . Un bon roi, loin de craindre la vérité, la prendra toujours 
lui-même pour guide, et voudra qu’elle éclaire son peuple.”
62 D’Holbach 1770, 142. Original: “un Despote qui commande à des sujets irrités ne devient point la victime de la 
vérité, mais de l’imprudence & de l’ignorance impétueuse.”
63 D’Holbach 1770, 143. Original: “les Princes équitables reconnoîtront qu’ils n’ont pas le droit de les priver de la 
vérité.”
Intellectual and Political Elites of the Enlightenment
74
more than a collection of the prince’s immediate thoughts”.64 The refutation shows its author to 
be reactionary and dismissive of the capacity of the non-elite sections of society. Superstition is 
said to be a foundation of order. The evolution of Frederick’s thought is complete. Here, he sees 
that truth should be reserved for a minority of men: “If truth was made for man, it would present 
itself naturally to his eyes, he would receive it without effort.”65 He dismisses d’Holbach’s ideas 
as the “vanity of the philosophical spirit”.66 Study of Frederick’s correspondence shows that these 
ideas can be traced back further than the publication of the Essai sur les préjugés: he wrote to the 
duchess of Gotha, declaring that:
There is no idea more extravagant than wishing to destroy superstition. Prejudice is reason for the 
people – does this imbecilic people deserve to be enlightened? Don’t we see that superstition is one 
of the ingredients that nature has placed in man’s composition? How can you fight nature, how can 
you destroy such a universal instinct?67
Moral and social order, contended Frederick, rely upon superstition, which is an essential 
component of the human mind and has shaped all civilisations. This explains why religions 
have continued for centuries: “This shows that the majority of human opinions are founded on 
prejudice, fables, errors and imposture . . . man is made for error . . . truth is not made for man.”68 
These prejudices and superstitions of the lower orders are needed to funnel the natural fears of 
men. Frederick’s argument relies on the paternalism of the mensonge officieux: “What would one 
gain from disabusing a man of illusions which make him happy?”69
Frederick argues that were all superstitions to be effectively wiped out, it would not be long 
before a new set of superstitions would replace them: “I dare almost to guarantee that in a state 
where all prejudice would be destroyed, it would not be thirty years before new ones would arise, 
and, well, the errors would quickly spread and entirely overrun it.”70 Here, one is faced with a 
64 Curran 2012, 101.
65 Frederick 1770, 5–6. Original: “Si la vérité étoit faite pour l’homme, elle se présenteroit naturellement à ses 
yeux, il la recevroit sans efforts.”
66 Frederick II 1770, 7. Original: “vanité de l’esprit philosophique.”
67 Frederick 1851. Letter to the Duchess of Gotha (1763), 215. Original: “Il n’y a point d’idée plus extravagante 
que celle de vouloir détruire la superstition. Les préjugés sont la raison du peuple, et ce peuple imbécile mérite-t-il 
d’être éclairé? Ne voyons nous pas que la superstition est un des ingrédients que la nature a mis dans la composition 
de l’homme? Comment lutter contre la nature, comment détruire généralement un instinct si universel.”
68 Frederick II 1770, 11. Original: “Voilà donc la plupart des opinions humaines fondées sur des préjugés, des 
fables, des erreurs & des impostures . . . l’homme est faite pour l’erreur . . . la vérité n’est pas faite pour l’homme.”
69 Frederick II 1770, 14. Original: “Que gagneroit-on à détromper un homme que les illusions rendent heureux?”
70 Frederick 1770, 19. Original: “J’ose presque assurer que dans un état où tous les préjugés seroient détruits, il 
ne se passeroit pas trente années qu’on en verroit renaître de nouveaux, & qu’enfin les erreurs s’étendroient avec 
rapidité, & l’inonderoient entièrement.”
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dilemma in the interpretation. This could be cultural pessimism fit to grace any era, or it could be 
argued that Frederick is engaged in a specific justification of his own elitist position. 
The Prussian monarch recognised that the Essai could not have been by Du Marsais, stating 
that “this book can only have been written by some resuscitated head of the League, who, still 
breathing the spirit of factions and troubles, wants to rouse the people into rebellion against the 
legitimate authority of the Sovereign”.71 Frederick’s critique limits itself to the French context 
of the book, and leads him to make an apology for both Louis XIV and Louis XV. France’s debt 
is attributed to the former’s war of succession, “the most just of all those that the monarch had 
undertaken”72 whilst the latter is excused as “innocent”.73 It is not surprising that the monarch 
defends the established order, preferring “softer means” rather than “overthrowing the established 
order”.74
D’Holbach’s long-time collaborator, Diderot, came to the defence of his friend’s view of 
enlightenment established in the Essai sur les préjugés. In 1771, Diderot composed a text which 
remained undiscovered until Franco Venturi’s 1937 edition, at which point it was conferred the 
title of Lettre sur l’Examen de l’Essai sur les préjugés ou Pages contre un tyran.75 This work was 
a stringent attack on Frederick the Great. Diderot did of course snub Frederick’s invitation to 
visit the Prussian Court and attacked Voltaire and Helvétius for not doing likewise. Diderot also 
attacked Frederick in his Principes de politique des souverains (1774). In Pages contre un tyran, 
Diderot takes d’Holbach’s defence against Frederick’s attack in the Examen de l’Essai:
The author of the Essai represents the world as it is: full of liars, scoundrels, and all kind of 
oppressor. There are despotic and nasty kings in this world; did he say that there weren’t? There are 
violent, wasteful, greedy ministers in this world; did he say that there weren’t? There are corrupt 
magistrates; did he say that there weren’t? There are deceitful, foolish, fanatical priests; did he say 
that there weren’t? There are men in this world blinded by all kinds of passions, harsh and negligent 
71 Frederick 1770, 52. Original: “ce livre ne peut avoir été écrit que par quelque chef de parti de la Ligue ressuscité, 
qui respirant encore l’esprit de faction & de trouble, veut exciter le peuple à la rébellion contre l’autorité légitime du 
Souverain.”
72 Frederick 1770, 59. Original: “la plus juste de toutes celles que le monarque avoit entreprises.”
73 Frederick 1770, 56.
74 Frederick 1770, 23. Original: “boulversant tout l’ordre établi.”
75 Diderot 1963, 127–148.
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fathers, ungrateful children, deceitful spouses; did he say that there weren’t? He did not, therefore, 
depict an idealized world.76
These barbs, aimed at the monarch though never received, emphasised the negative aspects of 
society – despotism, corruption, violence – and thus undermined Frederick’s criticism that the 
Essai sur les préjugés was too idealistic and ignored the true nature of the world. Diderot is then 
explicit that truth is always preferential to superstition, as the author of the Essai, d’Holbach, had 
written. Diderot writes:
But he did maintain, and still maintains, that man loves truth. All men love truth, because truth is 
a virtue; man is constantly seeking truth; it is the aim of all his studies, of all tasks, of all work. He 
hates error because he knows well that in whatever area, he cannot be mistaken without harming 
himself. True happiness is founded on truth. 77
Pointing out flaws in Frederick’s refutation was a simple task for Diderot. Yet he went further 
to support the original text’s supposition that truth was always necessary and always a basis 
of virtue. Diderot also criticized Helvétius for his fawning over Frederick, to whom Helvétius 
dedicated his posthumously published De l’Homme (1772). Diderot’s own attitude towards 
enlightened despotism is dealt with in the Mémoires pour Catherine II and the Observations sur 
le Nakaz, where anti-elite sentiment is particularly strong in sections I, VI, IX and XX.78
Frederick’s position must not be misunderstood. He did not wish the people to be kept in 
a state of superstition to be exploited. He does admit to this danger in the Examen. He even 
wishes that the public read more, mentioning to Voltaire that some works are more accessible 
than others: “Boulanger’s work is superior to the other, and more accessible to the people, for 
whom long deductions tire the mind, loosened and relaxed by the frivolities which constantly 
76 Diderot 1963, 135. Original: “L’auteur de l’Essai s’est représenté le monde tel qu’il est, plein de menteurs, de 
fripons, d’oppresseurs en tout genre. Des rois despotes et méchants, il y en a dans ce monde, a-t-il dit qu’il n’y en 
eût point? Des ministres violents, dissipateurs, avides, il y en a dans ce monde, a-t-il dit qu’il n’y en eût point? 
Des magistrats corrompus, il y en a dans ce monde, a-t-il dit qu’il n’y en eût point? Des prêtres fourbes, insensés, 
fanatiques, il y en a dans ce monde, a-t-il dit qu’il n’y en eût point? Des hommes aveuglés par toutes sortes de 
passions, des pères durs et négligents, des enfants ingrats, des époux perfides, il y en a dans ce monde, a-t-il dit 
qu’il n’y en eût point? Il n’a donc pas fait un monde idéal.”
77 Diderot 1963, 135–136. Original: “Mais il a prétendu et prétend encore que l’homme aime la vérité. En tout 
genre l’homme aime la vérité, parce que la vérité est une vertu; l’homme cherche sans cesse la vérité; c’est le but 
de toutes ses études, de tous ses soins, de tous ses travaux; il déteste l’erreur, parce qu’il sait bien qu’en quoi que ce 
soit, il ne saurait se tromper sans se nuire à lui-même; son vrai bonheur est fondé sur la vérité.”
78 See Israel 2011, 270–274.
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excite it.”79 Conversely, Frederick feels that enlightened absolutism is the key to peace, and that 
philosophy is the preserve of the elite.
This social and political elite clique of philosophy is epitomised by the Correspondance 
littéraire, the hand-written philosophical organ of the elite – its circulation was limited to 
European Courts, usually numbering around sixteen subscribers.80 Its editor Melchior Grimm 
reinforced this view among his royal and aristocratic readers, insisting that the truth is “for a 
small number of chosen ones . . . The people never participates”.81
Diderot fell out with Grimm over his relationships with various monarchs. Whereas Diderot 
remained constant and unchanged in the company of Catherine the Great, making no concessions 
to the monarch, he felt Grimm had mutated.82 Writing to Grimm in 1781 regarding one of Diderot’s 
prefatory notes addressed to monarchs, Diderot told him: “If you have the puerile vanity to think 
that you are targeted and are offended by the page addressed to kings . . . I pity you . . . My friend, 
I no longer recognize you. You have become, without realizing it maybe, one of the most veiled, 
but most dangerous anti-philosophers. You live among us, but you hate us.”83
This intellectual history so far has considered Frederick as the sole German participant in a 
Francophone debate. This final section will show that the influence of this whole debate about the 
elitism of knowledge politics, culminating in the French-speaking Berlin Académie’s debate, was 
felt in the wider field of German Aufklärung.
Arising from correspondence between d’Alembert and Frederick in the late 1770s, the Berlin 
Académie’s essay competition question for 1781 was “Is it useful to mislead the people?” The 
history of this competition and the answers received have been edited and published by Krauss.84 
It is taken into consideration here as a continuation of Frederick’s involvement with this issue.
Two prizes were issued, one for each side of the argument. The winning answer for the ‘yes’ 
side came from Frédéric de Castillon. In his answer to the question, he followed the distinction 
between philosopher and people, deciding that: “Error is made for the masses, and the masses 
79 Frederick II, king of Prussia, “Letter to Voltaire: Friday, 5 January 1767.” In Electronic Enlightenment 
<http://www.e-enlightenment.com/item/voltfrVF1150267b_1key001cor/>. Original: “L’ouvrage de Boulanger est 
supérieur à l’autre, et plus à la portée des gens du monde, pour qui de longues déductions fatiguent l’esprit, relâché 
et détendu par les frivolités qui l’énervent continuellement.”
80 Cf. Kölving & Carriat 1984. There were usually 15 or 16 subscribers, all from royalty or the nobility, and very 
much concentrated in the German states. For the full list of subscribers, see vol. I, xviii–xix.
81 Grimm 1878, 328. Original: “pour un petit nombre d’élus . . . Le peuple n’y participe jamais.”
82 Wilson 1972, 701.
83 Diderot 1970, 213–14, letter to Grimm 25 March 1781. Original: “Si vous avez la puérile vanité de prendre pour 
vous et de vous offenser de la page qui s’adresse aux Rois . . .Vous me fites grande pitié . . . Mon ami je [ne vous] 
reconnais plus. Vous êtes devenu sans vous en douter peut être, un des plus cachés, mais un des plus dangereux 
antiphilosophes, vous vivez avec nous, mais vous nous haissez.”
84 Krauss 1966. Original: “Est-il utile de tromper le peuple?”
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are the people of all classes. Let us separate the small number who are called philosophers, such a 
beautiful name, formerly so respectable, and so degraded nowadays, dragged through the mud.”85 
He concluded that: “It can, therefore, be useful to the people to be misled, as much in politics as in 
religion.”86 This view was opposed by Bernard Nicolas Lorinet, who used a theological argument: 
“I hold as impious he who claims that the people must be misled in order to be happy. This implies 
God had not provided the means for happiness.”87
Yet this French-language debate was not limited in its impact to Francophone circles. Indeed, 
the question of the relationship between elite philosophy and lying to the masses goes to the heart 
of the German debate of what exactly the Enlightenment was. To show this, we only need to refer 
briefly to the most well-known of definitions of the Enlightenment: Immanuel Kant’s answer to 
the Mittwochsgelellschaft’s question “Was ist Aufklärung?”88 Kant’s famous opening sentence to 
this essay demonstrates a familiarity with these debates: “Enlightenment is mankind’s exit from 
its self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to make use of one’s own understanding 
without the guidance of another. Self-incurred is this inability if its cause lies not in the lack of 
understanding but rather in the lack of the resolution and courage to use it without the guidance 
of another.”89 
This self-determination, an essentially anti-elitist position, could not, however, simply arise 
within the elitist systems of eighteenth-century religious and political control. Yet Kant argues 
that a strong political state (an enlightened absolutism) is necessary to facilitate the spread of 
enlightenment. Indeed, his essay explicitly names Frederick the Great as the prime model of the 
creator of the ideal preconditions of enlightenment. Though Kant claimed the enlightened age 
had not yet arrived, he did consider himself to be living in an age of enlightenment, which is 
synonymous with the age of Frederick the Great:
When we ask, are we now living in an enlightened age? the answer is: No, but we live in an age of 
enlightenment. As things now stand it is still far from true that men are already capable of using 
85 Krauss 1966, 25. Original: “L’erreur est faite pour la multitude, et celle-ci constitue le peuple de toutes les 
classes. Séparons-en le petit nombre qui, se décorant du nom de philosophe, nom si beau, si respectable jadis, et 
de nos jours avili et traîné dans la fange.”
86 Krauss 1966, 38. Original: “Il peut donc être utile au peuple d’être trompé, tant en politique qu’en religion.”
87 Krauss 1966, 51. Original: “Je tiens pour impie celui qui prétend qu’il faut tromper le peuple pour le rendre 
heureux; comme si Dieu n’avait donné les moyens du bonheur.”
88 On other answers to this question, see Schmidt 1996. Cf. Knudsen 1996 on the particularities of the German 
debates on Volksaufklärung in the 1780s.
89 Kant 1974, 9. Original: “Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten 
Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen. 
Selbstverschuldet ist diese Unmündigkeit, wenn die Ursache derselben nicht am Mangel des Verstandes, sondern 
der Entschließung und des Mutes liegt, sich seiner ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen.”
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their own reason in religious matters confidently and correctly without external guidance. Yet we 
have clear indications that the field is now being opened for them to work freely toward this, and the 
obstacles to general enlightenment or to the exit out of their self-incurred immaturity become even 
fewer. In this respect, this age is the age of enlightenment or the century of Frederick.90
Prussia is seen as exemplary. How can this be? After all, Frederick issued decrees on censorship 
in 1749 and 1772, whereby all texts had to be submitted to a panel for consideration before 
publication. And as we have seen, Frederick came to adopt a position where he endorsed lying 
to the masses to protect his own authority. Kant’s naming of Frederick, still in power (he died in 
1786), is pure artifice, and yet another example of Kant’s strategy, or a concession to the absolutist 
monarch, which historians need to read in context.
Yet the idea of a strong monarch capable of creating the conditions necessary for enlightenment 
was very much present in French writings on the subject. D’Holbach’s lesser-known Ethocratie 
ou, Le gouvernement fondé sur la morale (1776) also seems to advocate the use of absolute power, 
but in order to bring about change in public ideas: “Wisdom and equity armed with great power 
are capable of quickly changing the face of the state. Absolute power is very useful when it intends 
to crush abuses, abolish injustice, correct vice and reform mores.”91 Louis-Sébastien Mercier’s 
best-seller L’an 2440 (1771), a science-fiction dream, envisaged a revolution in society linked to 
the work of a philosopher-king: “The revolution was carried out effortlessly by the heroism of a 
great man. A philosopher king?”92
Conditions in Prussia would worsen with the accession of Frederick William II to the throne. 
The Wöllner Edict on Religion of 1788 would only strengthen censorship and cause more problems 
for Kant, as evidenced by the publication of Kant’s Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen 
Vernunft.93
90 Kant 1974, 15. Original: “Wenn denn nun gefragt wird: leben wir jetzt in einem aufgeklärten Zeitalter? so ist 
die Antwort: Nein, aber wohl in einem Zeitalter der Aufklärung. Daß die Menschen, wie die Sachen jetzt stehen, im 
ganzen genommen, schon imstande wären oder darin auch nur gesetzt werden könnten, in Religionsdingen sich 
ihres eigenen Verstandes ohne Leitung eines andern sicher und gut zu bedienen, daran fehlt noch sehr viel. Allein, 
daß jetzt ihnen doch das Feld geöffnet wird, sich dahin frei zu bearbeiten und die Hindernisse der allgemeinen 
Aufklärung oder des Ausganges aus ihrer selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit allmählich weniger werden, davon 
haben wir doch deutliche Anzeigen. In diesem Betracht ist dieses Zeitalter das Zeitalter der Aufklärung oder das 
Jahrhundert Friedrichs.”
91 D’Holbach 1776, 6. Original: “La sagesse et l’équité armées d’un grand pouvoir, sont capables de changer en 
peu de temps la face d’un Etat. Le pouvoir absolu est très utile quand il se propose d’anéantir les abus, d’abolir les 
injustices, de corriger le vice, de réformer les mœurs.”
92 Mercier 1771, 303. Original: “La révolution s’est opérée sans efforts et par l’héroisme d’un grand homme. Un 
roi philosophe.”
93 Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Cf. Allen Wood’s account of the publication details in Kant 2001 
[1793], 41.
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A second, much more marginal and almost forgotten German thinker provides further evidence 
that the radical ideas of this French-language discourse on deceiving the masses were not lost on 
the German intelligentsia. Heinrich Friedrich Diez (1751–1817), was an outspoken defender of 
d’Holbach’s Système de la Nature (1770). He wrote on many heretical topics in the period before 
he left Germany in 1784 to become the Prussian Ambassador in Constantinople, which curtailed 
his own writings on materialist ideas.94 He was also a prolific collector of manuscripts of la 
littérature clandestine and the influence of these French texts is evident in his own writings.95
In his 1772 essay Advantages of Secret Societies for the World,96 Diez takes up the theme of 
the autonomy of individuals regardless of their social class and background: “Thus the educated 
knave can already be their own guide.”97 To get from the state of ‘knave’ to autonomous citizen, 
Diez explains in his 1781 text Apologie der Duldung und Preßfreiheit that it is the responsibility 
of educated citizens to spread their learning – this is seen as a duty:
If the acquired skill of speech has raised us above animals, then the acquired skills of reading and 
writing raises us above the rabble, in that these activities are exceptionally adept at enlightening 
our understanding and clarifying our perceptions. It is therefore a great duty on the educated mind 
to share with others these insights and knowledge, and thereby increase the number of clever and 
happy people in the state, in that he seeks to reduce the great crowd of rabble.98
Diez is adamant that books can change people’s ideas, but this does depend on the ambition 
of the masses – they must be “ambitious enough to court the applause of the dispersed, clever 
thinkers – and all this through the only way befitting investigators of truth: writings.”99 Yet this 
sharing of knowledge and the ambition of the people need norms which can facilitate the process 
of enlightenment. 
For this radical thinker, superstition will destroy society’s laws. A secular state cannot tolerate 
superstitions in the public sphere, let alone promote them: 
94 Diez’s early works have recently been republished, edited by Manfred Voigts.
95 Diez’s 856 manuscripts, held in the Staatsbibliothek in Berlin, have been catalogued by Ursula Winter 1986–
1994.
96 Vortheile geheimer Gesellschaften für die Welt (Halle: Carl Hermann Hemmerde, 1772).
97 Diez 2010, 21. Original: “So kann schon der gebildete Knabe sich selbst führen.”
98 Diez 2010, 175. Original: “Hat uns die erworbene Fertigkeit zu sprechen über die Thiere erhoben: so erhebt 
uns die erworbene Fertigkeit zu lesen und zu schreiben über den Pöbel, indem sie vorzüglich geschikt ist, unsern 
Verstand zu erleuchten und unsre Empfindungen zu reinigen. Es ist daher dem gebildeten Geist eine große Pflicht, 
seine Känntnisse und Einsichten andern mitzutheilen und dadurch die Anzahl der Klügern und Glüklichern im 
Staat zu vermehren, indem er den großen Haufen des Pöbels zu verringern sucht.”
99 Diez 2010, 175. Original: “ehrgeizig genug, um den edlem Beyfall der zerstreuten, klügen Denker zu buhlen – 
alles durch den einzigen Weg, der sich für den Erforscher der Wahrheit geziemt, durch Schriften.”
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Superstition, if it would only remain at the level of opinions, would be just as harmless as unbelief. 
But because it oversteps this boundary, . . . it undermines national laws, in that it destroys civil 
peace and appoints itself as the tyrant of the people, who have committed no other crime than to 
profess other religious maxims.100
This leads Diez to his position of arguing against all forms of censorship: “The abolition of all 
censorship would firstly be a great benefit for freedom of thought.”101
Unlike Kant, Diez is forthcoming in his support for a secular morality, devoid of beliefs in 
providence: “I nonetheless respect the virtue of honest Christians, even if I think that their virtue 
is – oh why should I conceal it! – in no way superior to mine.”102 This anticlerical position is 
inherently anti-elitist in that it allocates marginal, non-conformist ideologies the same level 
of toleration as Christian morality. It is also inextricably linked to the view that each citizen is 
autonomous in their reasoning.
In a second, slightly amended Apologie der Duldung und der Preßfreiheit, which was published 
in the Berichte der allgemeinen Buchhandlung der Gelehrten in 1781 at Diez’s expense, Germany’s 
intellectual situation is compared unfavourably with England’s. Like many eighteenth-century 
observers, Diez sees England as a centre of freedom, allowing progress: “Through liberty, England 
has soared to be a giant of mind and character, which is foreign to all other peoples. . . . Germany 
has always been a slave of its faith. Its philosophy has thus remained as old as its faith.”103 This 
criticism of Germany (before such a political entity existed) is an implicit criticism of the elitist 
nature of its intellectual milieu.
In a tactic similar to La Mettrie’s in the Discours Préliminaire, Diez attempts to maintain that 
freethinkers’ books cannot cause any harm and thus should not be subject to censorship: “The use 
and harm of books is never as considerable as one imagines. A book is always a corrective to the 
impression of the other.”104 Just as La Mettrie had done, Diez justifies his advocacy of freethinking 
100 Diez 2010, 186. Original: “Der Aberglaube, wenn er blos bey Meinungen stehn bliebe, würde eben so 
unschädlich seyn als der Unglaube. Aber da er diese Grenze überschreitet . . . er untergräbt die Gesezze der 
Länder, indem er die bürgerliche Ruhe vernichtet und sich zum Tirannen über Menschen aufwirft, die weiter 
nichts verbrochen haben, als daß sie sich zu andern Glaubensmaximen bekennen.”
101 Diez 2010, 188. Original: “Die Aufhebung aller Censur würde schon ein großer Gewinn für die Geistesfreiheit 
seyn.”
102 Diez 2010, 191. Original: “Ich ehre gleichwohl die Tugend redlicher Christen, ob ich gleich fühle, daß ihre 
Tugend, was soll ichs verschweigen! um keinen Grad höher ist, als die meinige.”
103 Diez 2010, 200. Original: “Durch die Freyheit hat sich England zu einer Grösse des Geistes und Charakters 
aufgeschwungen, die allen andern Völkern fremd ist . . . Teutschland ist immer ein Sklave seines Glaubens 
gewesen. Seine Philosophie ist daher so alt geblieben wie sein Glaube.”
104 Diez 2010, 200. Original: “Der Nutzen und Schaden der Bücher ist niemals so beträchtlich, als man sich 
vorstellt. Ein Buch ist immer das Correctiv vom Eindruck des andern.”
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by referring to the small number of readers and the fact that the lower social classes do not 
read, despite having stated elsewhere that it is the duty of philosophers to spread enlightenment: 
“The number of free-thinking writings is, though, as small as the number of their readers. The 
apprehension of the growing apostasy is therefore always exaggerated. No freethinker has ever 
written for oafish citizens and farmers.”105 We can here ascertain the prominent influence of the 
writings of La Mettrie and d’Holbach on Diez’s pre-1784 writings.
To come to our conclusions, let us observe that, by the end of the eighteenth century, the 
optimism of the secular, radical Enlightenment was draining from some of its most fervent 
proponents. Naigeon, in his Mémoires sur la vie et les ouvrages de D. Diderot, admits that 
Diderot’s philosophy is not for everybody because it is erudite and complex. Referring to the Rêve 
de d’Alembert, he writes: 
The philosophy taught in the two dialogues is only suitable for a very small number of privileged 
beings; it demands too much study, meditation and knowledge for the fundamental principles and 
their full consequences to be admitted, and I do not mean only by the common man whose bad 
education makes him everywhere stupidly gullible and superstitious, but even by those placed in 
happier circumstances, who, with the means to inform themselves, have, regarding these matters, 
generally neither a faith any less blind than that of the people nor a more reasoned and motivated 
disbelief.106
Diderot himself was no optimist and despaired at the slow progress being made as he wrote to 
Sophie Volland in 1759: “the progress of enlightenment is limited, it hardly reaches the suburbs; 
the people there are too stupid, too miserable, and too busy. It stops there.”107
Taking the notion of the intellectual’s position in relation to the masses, we have revealed 
complex relationships between philosophers and a view of human beings as capable of self-
determination and as benefitting from the ‘truth’ regardless of the immediate ramifications for 
happiness. There were those who defended the absolute value of spreading truth, but they often 
105  Diez 2010, 200. Original: “Die Zahl der Freydenkerschriften ist aber eben so gering, als die Zahl ihrer Leser. 
Die Besorgniß der wachsenden Apostasie ist deshalb immer übertrieben. Für einfältige Bürger und Bauern hat 
noch kein Freydenker geschrieben.”
106 Naigeon 1821 (1798), 307–08. Original: “la philosophie enseignée dans les deux Dialogues, ne convient qu’à 
un très-petit nombre d’êtres privilégiés; elle exige trop d’études, de méditations, de connaissances, pour que les 
principes qui lui servent de base puissent jamais être admis dans toutes leurs conséquences, je ne dis pas seulement 
par le vulgaire que sa mauvaise éducation rend partout stupidement crédule et superstitieux, mais même par ceux 
qui, placés dans des circonstances plus heureuses, et avec plus de moyens de s’instruire, n’ont en général sur ces 
matières ni une foi moins aveugle que celle du peuple, ni une incrédulité plus motivée et plus réfléchie.”
107  Diderot 1956, 299. Letter to Sophie Volland, 30 October 1759. Original: “les progrès de la lumière sont limités; 
elle ne gagne guère les faubourgs. Le peuple y est trop bête, trop misérable et trop occupé: elle s’arrêta là.”
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had to disguise their position, or write anonymously. This led to instances where these very same 
writers would defend themselves by disingenuously claiming that philosophical writings are not 
linked to changes in public opinion, when writing otherwise elsewhere. This analysis has shown 
us that the context of texts is crucial to understanding a thinker’s true position. La Mettrie can 
thus be rehabilitated from his current reputation as dismissive of the ‘masses’. The philosophes 
were thus carefully negotiating their own position as the intellectual elites, without necessarily 
despising or disdaining the people. When a writer like d’Holbach, himself part of the feudal 
social elite – a member of the nobility – strongly criticized the absolute power of the monarchy, it 
demonstrated a divisive issue in the struggle for access to ‘truth’.
Frederick’s reactionary responses to the ‘threat’ represented by secular ‘democracy’ – as 
evidenced by his quasi-censorship of La Mettrie, and his correspondence and his refutation of the 
Essai sur les préjugés – show that the elite’s contempt for the masses was able to voice itself in a 
reasoned and articulate way. Moreover, this explains why it was so rare to find explicit advocacy 
of enlightening the masses. This also helps to demonstrate the essential tension between the two 
forms of power: intellectual and political, which structured the period.
We have also shown that these elite-level, French-language debates between the constellation 
of French philosophes and the Prussian monarch engendered a shift in German discourse and 
influenced German ideas on the utility of enlightening or deceiving the people. In conclusion, 
we can revise Payne’s 1976 assessment of the philosophes as disinclined to instruct the people 
by taking into account the conditions which prevented clear expression of such intentions. This 
inclination can be recovered in the thought of the philosophes, keen to negotiate their own position 
in the social hierarchies of the day. It is wrong to impugn a whole generation of thinkers, at a time 
when contemporary power structures hindered the expression of egalitarian political views.
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